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 INNOVATIONS IN IRRIGATION FINANCING: 












  Financing for water projects, especially for irrigation, has been moving towards 
collapse in recent years due to declining donor and government funding. Some Indian 
states have undertaken innovative institutional reforms by setting up financially 
autonomous corporations to mobilise required funds from the domestic bond market. This 
analysis of the performance of one such corporation, Karnataka￿s Krishna Bhagya Jal 
Nigam Limited, indicates that although adequate funds were mobilised, and physical 
works are on schedule, the new institution did not attempt to enhance overall irrigation 
performance and to move towards financial sustainability of the irrigation project. This 
paper describes the background of this institution, its achievements, inadequacies and 
potential of the innovative efforts made in irrigation financing reforms.  
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INNOVATIONS IN IRRIGATION FINANCING: 









Irrigation and domestic water supply projects worldwide face serious 
underfunding.  The World Water Commission (2000) reported that worldwide, additional 
investment of $100 billion per year is needed to meet needs of irrigation, water supply, 
and sanitation infrastructure to meet the food and domestic needs of a growing 
population.  At the same time, funding from traditional sources￿government budgets 
and development assistance￿is drying up.  Alternative financing arrangements are 
needed even to sustain existing investment in water systems.  This is not only a concern 
of governments, but also of the international community.  For example, the World Water 
Council, the Third World Water Forum and the Global Water Partnership have formed a 
high-level panel led by M. Michel Camdessus, former General Manager of the 
International Monetary Fund, to consider solutions to the future global financial needs of 
the water sector. The panel is to identify innovative approaches to mobilizing resources, 
as well as how financing arrangements can contribute to better water governance. Yet  
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much of the emphasis in global discussions has been on international financial markets, 
and particularly the role of multinational corporations in financing water-related 
infrastructure.  Much less attention has been given to the potential of domestic financial 
markets to provide such funding.   Even in developing countries, these may control 
substantial resources.  Since the 1980s, the Indian capital markets have emerged as an 
important source of funds for corporate units in the private and public sectors.  Primary 
capital mobilization by private sector companies in the form of equity and debt rose from 
less than Rs 2 billion in 1980 to over Rs 43 billion in 1990-91 and then recorded a 
quantum jump to over Rs 260 billion by the end of 1994-95 (GOI, 1996; 81).  During this 
period, several state governments have begun to tap into this domestic financial market to 
finance irrigation development.   
Canal irrigation financing in India suffers from several inter-related problems: 
First, the funding for construction of on-going or new canal networks has been shrinking, 
leading to undue delay in completion of projects, which in turn raises costs and reduces 
benefits.  At the same time, the resources for normal operation and maintenance are also 
under severe pressure as the cost recovery from canal irrigation is extremely low, and the 
state budgets are not able to allocate more funds because of the overall fiscal crunch. 
Furthermore, existing systems do not perform well, which is often attributed to 
management problems, agency incentives, as well as inadequate maintenance.  In turn, the 
poor performance of many surface irrigation systems makes farmers unwilling to pay 
more for their water, thus limiting the resources that irrigation systems generate to cover 




state of affairs points towards impending financial crisis in Indian canal irrigation. 
Without urgent steps to reverse this trend, such as through innovative institutional 
reforms, canal irrigation would remain much below its potential and could be heading for 
a collapse.  
    This is not the first time that such institutional reform is being proposed. Indeed, the 
working group on major and medium irrigation projects for India￿s Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-
97) considered the issue of inadequate funding for projects in the Seventh Plan. Against the spill 
over liability of Rs 260 billion for major and medium projects that remained uncompleted from 
previous Plans, the Seventh Plan outlay was only Rs115 billion.  To enable the central government 
to assume a more positive role, in 1988 the Ministry of Water Resources formulated a proposal for 
establishment of an Irrigation Finance Corporation to provide financial assistance to projects of 
national importance in the irrigation sector (GOI, 1995).  Though this proposal was supported by a 
large number of states, the planning commission did not approve it. Over the years, the states that 
had important ongoing projects established autonomous irrigation finance corporations. In south 
India, Karnataka’s Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Limited (KBJNL) is one of them. 
  Does KBJNL provide a model for institutional reforms to solve the problems of canal 
irrigation financing? Can one take the structure and functioning of KBJNL as a model for 
ensuring efficiency, equity and sustainability of canal irrigation? The theoretical literature 
suggests that converting government irrigation departments into financially autonomous 
irrigation agencies (FAIA) can contribute to these objectives.  However, the extent to which 
this type of reform has been effective in practice also needs to be examined.  This paper 




problems of canal irrigation financing and management. In the following section we discuss the 
potential of such reforms.  We then turn to the origin of KBJNL, its accomplishments and 
weaknesses, and conclude with broader recommendations.   
 
2.  POTENTIAL OF FINANCIALLY AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATION 
AGENCIES 
 
  While conventional government and multilateral financing for irrigation is 
decreasing, the capital and debt markets provide an important alternative source of 
funding.  The debt markets trade bonds of public sector undertakings and corporate 
debentures.  In India, major investors in these bonds are institutions, due to the 
investment pattern specified by the Indian government.
4  There are prospects for such 
financing to become a major source of funding in the near future, but there are certain 
conditions to be met: 
•  Only companies and corporations can issue papers, which can be traded in these 
markets to raise funding.  State-issued papers are subject to the overall ceiling on 
state borrowing.  
•  The bonds must be professionally designed and issued, with terms, interests, and 
payments modes, which attract the specific market segment to which a particular 
issue is addressed. 
                                                           
 
4  The Indian government specifies a pattern of investment to be followed by non-government institutions to 
invest their provident funds, superannuation funds, and gratuity funds.  The revised version, effective from  
April, 1998 (Government of India, Ministry of Finance notification dated 12 June 1998) includes: 25% of 
investment in central government securities; 15% in government securities issued by any state government; and 
40% in bonds or securities of public financial institutions, public sector companies (including KBJNL), the 




•  The issuing companies or corporations must have the capacity to generate 
enough cash flow to service the bonds, which is constrained by the very low 
levels of water charges at present. 
  But the potential of setting up financially autonomous irrigation agencies goes 
beyond raising funds.  A review of irrigation financing in several countries (Small et 
al.1989) identified FAIAs as a potentially powerful reform for improving irrigation 
performance. Small and Carruthers (1991) argue that this approach is desirable from the 
efficiency perspective because a policy of user fees implemented by a FAIA creates the 
potential for improvements, both in the operation and maintenance of existing irrigation 
facilities and in the process by which investments decisions are made.   
  The creation of FAIA can be an effective means for: a) introducing administrative 
and financial autonomy; b) increasing accountability; c) facilitating contacts with, and 
contracting out to farmers, NGOs and private firms; d) introducing less politicized 
procedures to set and collect water charges; and e) mobilizing private sector funds. The key 
concept here is self-financing.  After a pre-defined nascent period, such corporations must 
provide for O&M and recurrent expenditure out of their own revenues, even if capital 
expenditures may still continue to be funded by the state.  They must have both the mandate 
and the authority to set water charges at a level adequate to cover their expenses and service 
their debts.  Once such self-financing has been established and recourse to treasury funding 
for recurrent and O&M expenditure cut off, they can also sell debt in the bond market 




  The potential for improvements in O&M stems in part from the greater control that a 
FAIA can have over its budget. But the key to attain higher efficiency under FAIA lies in 
linking incentives of the agency staff with their performance in satisfying the demands of 
end users. Having the income of these FAIAs dependent on the revenue they themselves 
collect for irrigation service would provide incentive for more regular and stricter collection 
of revenues from user groups.  Because users withholding payment in response to poor 
service will then have a direct impact on agency budgets (including salaries), it also creates 
incentives for better irrigation service to facilitate fee payment. Financial autonomy thus 
provides a functional link between collection of revenue from users of irrigation water and 
more effective irrigation performance by suppliers of water, as confirmed by Svendsen￿s 
(1991) study of the reforms of the National Irrigation Agency (NIA) in the Philippines. 
Further, with financial autonomy, incentives are created to increase agency income, and to 
reduce costs.  
  Taken together, these factors should help establish a relationship of mutual 
dependence between the supply agency (i.e. irrigation department) and the farmer user-
group.  The irrigation agency provides an essential service to farmers, i.e. irrigation water in 
the quantity and quality desired by the user, while users, in turn, provide the agency with the 
financial resources necessary for its existence and operation. This mutual dependence can 
result in greatly expanded potential for efficient irrigation management (Gulati, Svendsen, 
and Choudhury 1994: A-78).  It is the possibility of creating this critical link that 




FAIA, it is necessary to establish the link between incentives and performance, irrespective 
of the kind of financial autonomy it has.   
  Structurally, FAIA can be an agency of user groups, or a private company, or an 
autonomous corporation created by the government under the Company Act, or a 
combination of any two or more of these. What matters is that it should introduce 
commercial principles, link incentives with performance, meet the O&M costs (and a part of 
capital cost), and promote efficiency, equity and sustainability in the use of canal irrigation 
waters. The concept of a corporation like KBJNL is one of these.  
  KBJNL is not the first attempt in India in this direction. Andhra Pradesh State 
Irrigation Development Corporation was registered in 1974 to function on corporate lines 
and access private and institutional finance.  But cost recovery never even approached actual 
expenses; the corporation accumulated heavy losses and could not service its bank loans.  It 
no longer attracts bank finance due to its arrears. The Gujarat Water Resources 
Development Corporation, wholly owned by the Government of Gujarat and registered 
under the Companies Act, engaged in groundwater exploration, construction, and 
management of the public tubewells, but faced worsening financial and operational 
conditions ever since its inception in 1975.
5 The 1994 finance committee suggested the 
corporation should be wound up (Kolavalli and Raju, 1995; Shah et al., 1995).  
                                                           
5 The corporation has accumulated a loss of over Rs 700 million and depends on the government for large 
subsidies to continue its operations. It faces constraints on what it can charge for its services and cost escalation 
add to the deficit every year. Nearly 20% of the deep tubewells that were not being adequately utilized have 
been closed down; the corporation began leasing out the tubewells to users in 1987 to reduce costs. It had a 





  Four Indian states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh) have now 
set up corporations, or Nigams, that focus on mobilizing funds for surface irrigation. All 
four states started their corporations mainly to overcome the reduced budgetary allocations 
for the irrigation sector. These corporations were broadly established on the lines of public 
sector companies, to mobilise funds.
6 Emphasis was on mobilising funds from institutions 
like commercial banks, cooperative banks, urban and rural cooperatives, and financial 
institutions, directly or indirectly regulated by or linked to government, rather than 
individuals. 
  However, it is easy to underestimate the dangers of introducing commercial 
principles in a situation where the forces of competition don￿t work. The Expert group on 
Commercialisation of Infrastructure (India, 1996) examined the potential to raise finances 
from markets and improve operational efficiency by introducing some commercial 
principles in infrastructure projects, but it also warns that despite the new possibilities of 
competition, most infrastructure services retain very strong monopolistic elements.  The 
state continues to be responsible for providing appropriate regulatory frameworks, which 
assist investors and infrastructure entities on the one hand and protect consumers from 
monopolistic exploitation on the other. The commercialization of infrastructure and 
unbundling also lead to a considerable increase in transaction costs which have to be 
mitigated through transparent and appropriate regulation (GOI, 1996; 2). In a free market 
environment, costs of production/service are kept low by competition. But canal irrigation is 
more of a natural monopoly, and unless its costs are kept under tight control and its 
                                                           




operations made transparent, it runs the danger of passing on the high costs to the users of 
water (Herath and Gulati, 2002). Indeed, the corporate arrangement provides less 
accountability and transparency than for government expenditures. The price for faster turn-
around in expenditure appears to be a reduction in crosschecks. Thus, there is need for an 
independent regulatory body such as an IRCCI as a complement to financially autonomous 
agencies, to ensure transparency in the operations of such an agency. These reforms should 
have consumer as their priority and social interests and not the means or intermediate goals 
such as privatization, or bringing about independent regulation. Many contradictions which 
regulators today face would not exist had the consumer been given primacy (Morris, 2001).  
  In such a context, setting up some form of independent regulatory commission is 
needed to bring transparency in the operations of FAIA, especially if it is to work on 
commercial lines, and to ensure that pricing of water is distanced from political interference.  
FAIA represents a move towards bringing some elements of corporate culture in irrigation 
financing.  One thinks of charging the users of water to recover all costs of O&M at least, 
and if possible even capital costs.  A regulatory body that creates transparency is essential to 
keep costs down and prevent exploitation of water users by the corporation.  This same 
transparency can also help distance pricing from political interference. When the current 
level water tariff is so low that even recovering O&M costs may require drastic increases in 
water rates (often more than four times), users are likely to object, which obviously has 
political repercussions, and no political party can afford to ignore this. It becomes essential 




and to instill confidence in them that higher tariff would help the agency to render better 
service.   
3.  ORIGINS OF KRISHNA BHAGYA JAL NIGAM LIMITED 
 
  At the root of the KBJNL formation lies the sharing of the Krishna river water between 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh states. As each state developed projects to use water, 
conflicts arose between them.  In 1971, the Krishna Waters Dispute Tribunal (KWDT) was set up to 
allocate utilisation levels of Krishna river waters. The Tribunal reported its findings by 1973, and 
the states provided the answers for the queries raised by the Tribunal. In 1976, the Tribunal said that 
the award (popularly known as the Bachawat Award) may come under review by May 2000 AD.   
(However, due to lack of initiative from these states, the award has not been reviewed and the old 
status is continuing into 2002.)  Thus a deadline was set to utilize the given water allocations by 
three states. Under this Award, Karnataka is to utilize 734 TMC  (20.7 million ha m) of water from 
Krishna river. 
  The Upper Krishna Project (UKP) was developed to take advantage of the award.
7 The state 
government sought World Bank assistance for UKP during 1980.  The World Bank gave two 
credits: one expired by 1986 and another by June 1997, for a total loan of Rs 5.48 billion.  
Meanwhile, in 1988, the state felt the need for an authority to look into required land acquisition, 
which was posing a major problem in project implementation.  
The triggers for setting up KBJNL were: the cumbersome process of land acquisition and the 
                                                           
7 The UKP consists of construction of two dams across the Krishna river and a network of canals. The main 
storage is at Almatti Dam and a lower Dam at Narayanpur is to serve as a diversion dam. The project is planned 
to be implemented in different stages and phases. A river bed project to generate 672 million units of electricity 




deadline of 2000 AD to complete all physical works of UKP.  In 1993, only seven years were left 
to complete the project.  The future World Bank aid was uncertain because of problems with 
rehabilitation and resettlement in the UKP,
8 and a dispute with Andhra over the height of the 
Almatti Dam, with its consequent impact on water availability for Andhra. The stipulations of 
the World Bank loans became difficult for the Government of Karnataka to meet, and further 
credit on UKP was suspended owing to inadequate efforts by the state government in 
rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) in the UKP.  Further, the focus of the World Bank also 
shifted to water resources consolidation projects, which accorded priority to basin development 
over individual projects.  
  In a normal course, the state budget could have supported the entire UKP execution, but 
then the project completion could have been anywhere from 15 to 20 years, since the state 
budgetary allocation of around Rs 10 billion is meant for all major and medium projects in the state.  
UKP alone needed Rs 10 billion every year from 1994-95 to 2000.
9 The goal was to mobilise 
massive funding (up to Rs 60 billion) in a short time. The World Bank funding for UKP was drying 
up, and the revenue from existing irrigation projects was too meagre to give any support to the huge 
funding requirements of UKP. In Karnataka, revenue generation from the irrigation sector is not 
very encouraging. Out of Rs 2.3 billion outstanding, actual collection is only Rs 300 million. Penal 
water fees of around Rs 2.15 billion were waived during the parliamentary elections held in March 
1996.  Current water fee levels in Karnataka remained quite low, ranging from Rs 37 to 370 per ha, 
                                                           
 
8 Even after 12 years after the Bachawat Award, the R&R work has remained incomplete.  The revised estimates for 
compensation increased  the R&R budget to Rs 25 billion.  
 
9  The financial scenario was not much different in the other states sharing Krishna water - Maharashtra and 
Andhra Pradesh.  The other states also established similar corporations for the same reason, i.e, to mobilize 




depending on the crop. A high level committee headed by the finance minister, set up in 1993 to 
consider raising water fee levels, had not come out with clear suggestions by mid-1998 because of 
concerns over political implications. In its July 1998 meeting the committee suggested but did not 
officially announce doubling the current water fee levels, and gradually raising it by four times￿
still well below the amount needed to recover recurrent O&M.  
These conditions led to an all-party support in the Karnataka Assembly for the formation 
of an autonomous irrigation agency that could raise funds, design and ensure construction of 
UKP within the stipulated time frame of up to 2000, and manage it on efficient basis. The 
outcome was KBJNL, which was registered under the Companies Act in August 1994, and 
charged with mobilizing funds for UKP.
10   To fulfil the objectives and reap the benefits listed 
above, the company is authorised to borrow or raise required resources through issue of shares or 
debentures or any other securities. The company has been empowered to sell water and recover 
revenues from individuals and groups of farmers including those in the CADA, town and city 
municipalities and industries.  It is also entrusted with rehabilitation and resettlement of the 
people affected by the project. 
  In 1995, the government contemplated an outlay of Rs 57.45 billion for the completion of 
                                                           
10 KBJNL was created to ensure completion of UKP with  the following main objectives: a) to  undertake  
planning, investigation, estimation, execution, operation and maintenance of all the irrigation projects coming 
under the Upper Krishna Project in the Krishna river basin or Karnataka up to outlet point only, keeping in view 
the Tribunal award, and the allocation of water made by the government of Karnataka;  b) to prepare detailed 
project reports and estimates of irrigation projects and to obtain their approvals as the case may be; c) to 
implement the externally aided Upper Krishna Project in Krishna valley; d) to undertake resettlement and 
rehabilitation of the people affected by construction of the Project; e) to undertake measures for the protection 
and improvement of environment and health and well being of the people including the treatment of catchment 
areas of the project; f) to draw standards and specifications for implementation of the project and maintenance 
thereof;  g) to promote schemes in the state for flood control in the Krishna river basin in Karnataka;  h) to 
promote schemes for irrigation and navigation; i) to promote schemes for irrigation and water supply in the 





UKP, which was revised to 82 billion in 2001. It included Rs 30.5 billion from market borrowing, 
Rs 24.5 billion from the government of Karnataka, and another Rs 2.45 billion from internal 
generation.  Internal accruals are mainly through interest earned from market borrowings, which are 
parked temporarily in commercial banks. To raise funds from the market, KBJNL needed some 
assets. So by November 1995 the state government transferred about Rs 10 billion worth of 
assets, including dam, canal network, buildings, vehicles, and all other physical works completed 
by that date, to KBJNL. 
  Initially only non-World Bank funded works was supposed to be undertaken for 
completion by KBJNL.  After the Bank’s credit date was over, from April 1998, all works were 
transferred to KBJNL for implementation. With this change, the outlays were revised twice (in 
July, 1998 and in 2001) and fixed at Rs 82 billion. This includes Rs 10 billion on five lift irrigation 
schemes.  By 2000 KBJNL planned to spend Rs 55 billion, mostly on completion of physical 
work.
11 The second revision was made to include lining of canals (Rs 25 billion) and carry out 
construction of field channels below the outlet. 
What has been the result of creating KBJNL?  In the following sections we assess the 
financial outcomes in terms of successful mobilization of capital, physical 
accomplishments in terms of pace of project implementation, reduction and reduction of  
the financial burden on the state, cost recovery, and overall improvement in delivery of  
improvement in delivery of irrigation services.  
 
                                                           
11 KBJNL has to mobilize funds to meet R&R costs also. From 1996-99, KBJNL incurred Rs.3.4 billion on 




4.   PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 
MOBILIZATION OF CAPITAL FUNDS  
 
  The state government￿s efforts to raise funds through KBJNL are an innovative 
experiment.  To borrow funds from the market, the company got a rating from CRISIL, a 
credit rating agency.  The rating is based on the financial health of the government of 
Karnataka, which provided the guarantee to all the issues of KBJNL, and gets revised each 
year. In 1998, the rating for KBJNL bonds was ￿A (SO)￿, which is considered quite a safe 
investment from risk point of view of the investors.   
  KBJNL is eligible to borrow up to 1.25 times its assets.  The government has 
transferred all project assets to the KBJNL account, including lands, colonies, buildings, 
canals, dams, and other physical work.  Based on book value, total assets are worth of Rs 24 
billion, according to KBJNL records. To begin with in March 1996, funds were borrowed 
through public issue at a hefty 17.5% interest, owing to tight money market conditions.  
Over time, as market conditions eased, the interest rates were reduced.  The issue in July 
1998 was at 14.25% interest rate.  
In the beginning, KBJNL went in for public issue mainly to reduce the risk 
perception. But the transaction cost of raising funds through public issue are very high, 
almost 7-8% of the sum raised. On private placement, the company appoints a few lead 
managers, on commission basis, who in turn take responsibility to get full subscription 
(generally from financial institutions, corporate bodies, and other agencies) to total issue 




used private placement of bonds. Under private placement, each issue has on an average 
of about 300-400 applicants, which makes for easy debt servicing and cuts down the 
transaction costs significantly.  Initially the company officials and ministers pursued 
investors to subscribe to the KBJNL issues.  From the 5th series onwards, the company 
opted for professional help. It had appointed seven lead managers (with 0.3% commission) 
who have taken responsibility to get subscription to all issues.  
  By August 2001, KBJNL raised Rs 46 billion through ten issues (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1) and responses to issues are good.  Every time the issue gets over subscribed as 
shown in Table 1. With that, the company is confident of raising the remaining Rs 36 billion 
to meet that total target of Rs 82 billion by 2005.  In recent years, KBJNL has increasingly 
tapped central government schemes to mobilise funds.
12 Through the Accelerated Benefit of  
irrigation Project Fund scheme of the Government of India, it has mobilised Rs 23 billion 
during 2001/02. 
                                                           
12 The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development has created the Accelerated Benefit of 
irrigation Project Fund to complete the long-pending projects owing to financial constraints. Through this 




Table 1￿Yearwise amount mobilized by KBJNL through August 2001   
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                                                                                                             Total   30116.37 
 
Source: KBJNL, August 2001 
Notes:  Series II (1996-97) was public placement; all other issues were private placements. 
Amount retained exceeded the issue size because almost all issues were over-subscribed and KBJNL 











Figure 1￿Current Status of Bonds 
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  As of 1998, KBJNL had a total of 397,000 bond holders. The KBJNL bonds and 
public issue have been subscribed to by investors from all over the country. They include 
commercial banks and rural and urban cooperatives (including Maharashtra and Gujarat 
cooperatives).  A majority are institutional investors, while the first public issue had 
numerous individual investors. Major categories of investors include: Commercial banks 
(50%), Corporate bodies (like Sahara, Peerless) (20%), Provident Funds  (20%) and 












Figure 2￿Major Categories of Investors in KBJNL Bonds 
 













  One of the major reasons behind KBJNL￿s success in raising funds appears to be the 
involvement of the Government of Karnataka, (GOK), which has guaranteed the payment of 
interest and the principal amount through a tripartite agreement between GOK, KBJNL and 
the trustee of bond holders (earlier ICICI and now Vijaya Bank).  Under this agreement, an 
escrow account has been created and it is funded substantially through budgetary resources 
of the state, including any revenue of KBJNL through water fees. The GOK has to transfer 
funds to escrow account 45 days before the due date for interest payment.  By June 1998, 
GOK paid Rs 2.94 billion as interest through this account. From the investor￿s security point 
of view, therefore, an annualized yield ranging from almost 19% (for issue no.2) to 14.76% 
(for issue no. 7-A) on these bonds looks attractive. The bonds are in fact better priced than 




sought to be provided through the exit routes as well as by listing them on two leading stock 
exchanges.  
KBJNL has done quite a successful job of mobilizing capital resources for irrigation.  
The additions in structures over the last five years will keep raising the book value of assets.  
Fund raising has become easy for KBJNL because Karnataka is not a heavily indebted state, 
and Rs 50 billion is not so high as to shake up the government￿s financial health in crucial 
conditions.  According to KBJNL management, the highest repayment of Rs 17 billion in 
2004 is manageable. KBJNL’s borrowing is only for a fixed period. Investors know the 
purpose of borrowing and to boost up their confidence, the project completion is on 
schedule.  Other reasons include the lack of political interference and the fact that the 
company also places its funds temporarily in other banks to earn interest (at 9-10%). 
PACE OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
Because of the regular flow of funds through KBJNL and the high priority given in 
the state to complete all structures of UKP by the initial deadline of the year 2000, the 
project made reasonably good progress, both in terms of physical construction as well as in 
spending financial resources. By March 1999, the project achieved 50% of its financial 
target and 48% of its physical target set for the year 2000 in terms of irrigation potential 
created (259,000 ha) and 28% in terms of actual utilization (145,000 ha till mid-1997). 
Originally, KBJNL was entrusted the task of providing storage of 173 TMC and the main 
canals, but due to inadequate performance of command area development, even the lining of 




billion to be mobilised during the next four years.  KBJNL has allocated Rs 6.5 billion 
during 2001/02 to construct field channels to irrigate 145,000 ha.      
FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE STATE 
 
 During the last 20 years, the government of Karnataka had allocated Rs 13 billion for the 
UKP project. As KBJNL increased its market borrowing, the state support (state’s share of 
capital outlay) was reduced from 71 per cent in 1995-96 to just 6 per cent in 1997-98, while 
KBJNL￿s share increased from 29 percent to 94 per cent over the same period (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3￿Share of KBJNL and government in expenditure on UKP 
 
 























   KBJNL had to maintain the regular flow of funds to complete its planned physical 
works by the year 2005. The company has planned to borrow up to Rs 36.7 billion during 
the next four years. The KBJNL has relieved the Karnataka government from the larger 
chunk of financial burden of UKP, at least in the immediate short run. But in due course, 




ultimately it is going to fall on the state government, as that is the ultimate guarantor. 
Over the years, KBJNL has made some experiments to use its funds more efficiently. Some 
of them are: a) it is getting Rs 4.04 billion at lower interest rate (Rs 2.04 billion at 9%, and 
another Rs 2 billion at 12.5-14%) from the Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
for housing activity in the rehabilitation and resettlement area; b) it is planning to return 
funds borrowed at higher interest rates (14-17.5%) through borrowing funds at lower 
interest rates, currently prevailing in the money market; c) it has got approval to raise funds 
under infrastructure schemes, which are available at cheaper interest rates because the 
returns to investors are exempt from income tax; and d) it has requested the a credit rating 
agency to suggest avenues to raise revenue in the UKP project. This would include toll tax 
on 600 km roads in the UKP command area, toll collection on six bridges constructed on the 
Krishna river, fishing rights, leasing out fibre optical lines for communication to be installed 
along the major canals, growing and selling of trees on canal bunds, and others. 
Although KBJNL has made considerable progress in mobilizing capital for 
construction, it has not made structural reforms within the organization, nor has it paid 
attention to repayment.   KBJNL is not generating income on its own. So far KBJNL has 
failed to revise the water rates to any reasonable level that can cover O&M costs, let 
alone repayment of debt.  The organisation depends on the government￿s budgetary 
support for both interest and principle payments to bond subscribers and shareholders.  
Because of the continued dependence on the state budget to pay for expenses, the 






Theoretically, KBJNL is empowered to levy and collect water rates in areas where water 
is supplied or made available by the company.
13 A Committee was constituted in 
December 1995 to make recommendations on the necessary organizational set-up and 
modalities for levy and collection of water rates.
 The Final Report of the Committee was 
discussed with the Chief Secretary in June 1996, and it was agreed that a revised proposal 
would be prepared considering the following aspects: a) Organizational cost of the 
proposed set up for levy and collection of water rates; b) Action plan for the development 
of Water Users Co-operative Societies (WUCs) and supply of water in bulk to these 
societies, including the plans for rehabilitating the distribution network and fixing of 
measuring devices; c) Rationalization of the staffing pattern for the Operation and 
Maintenance zone of KBJNL considering the pace of turnover of irrigation management 
to water users societies and the organizational arrangements required during the transition 
period. 
  The existing water rates were very low, covering less than 4 percent of the O&M 
cost (about 3.75%). The Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water (India, 1992) suggested 
that, to begin with, cost recovery should be aimed at least to cover the O&M costs and 1% 
interest on capital employed. Based on this approach, the pricing per hectare in KBJNL area 
would work out to Rs 962/ha--close to Rs 945/ha. calculated by the state irrigation 
                                                           
 13  The Karnataka Irrigation (Levy of Betterment Contribution and Water Rate) (Second Amendment) Act, 





14 Even the Agricultural Policy of the government of Karnataka (Karnataka, 
1995), has suggested increasing the water fee levels to 5% of the gross value of the 
produce.
15 As indicated in Table 2, the water rates for irrigated dry crops in the Upper 
Krishna Project vary from Rs 37.50/ha (for pulses) to Rs 100/ha (for cotton). If water rates 
are progressively increased at 25% annually, as recommended by the board of directors of 
KBJNL to the state government, the water rates for different crop areas work out as shown 
in Table 2. The state Government agreed, in principle, to progressively increase the water 
rates for forecasting the revenues receivable by the Nigam.  CRISIL accepted this intention 
of the government for rating of KBJNL, although the rate increase remained pending until 
2001.  In July 2001,  
  KBJNL implemented the same water rates that the Government of Karnataka 
announced for the whole state.  This ended all speculations of having a different set of 
water rates for the KBJNL area.  As indicated on Table 2, the new rates adopted are less 
than 17 percent of the KBJNL proposed rates for all crops except sugarcane and tobacco, 
which are minor crops in the KBJNL command, and less than 3 percent of the gross value 
of production.   
                                                           
14 Actual O & M costs in UKP are turning out to be Rs 912/ha, which is almost 200 per cent higher than 
projected by KBJNL  (Rs 300/ha.) in its prospectus.  Rs.945 per ha is based on the KBJNL’s proposed water 
rates, which is 15 times higher than the current rates.  
 15  Based on the data for the year 1995-96, obtained from the agricultural wing of UKP-CADA, 5% of the gross 
value of produce per ha works out to: 
Kharif Season                    Rabi Season 
Bajra                 325  Rabi Jowar   450 
Hybrid Jowar   450  Bengalgram  500 
Greengram       350  Sunflower  550 
Sunflower        500  Groundnut  800 
Groundnut       785   


























b  891 988.45 111 
Paddy 86
c  86.45
d  1473 247.10  17 
Cotton 99  98.80  n.a.  148.25  - 
Horticultural 
Crops 
99 98.80  885  148.25  17 
Wheat 54  54.34  885  148.25  17 
Groundnut 59  59.28 885 148.25 17 
Sunflower n.a.  -  n.a. 148.25  - 
Jowar, Maize, 
Bajra, Ragi and 
semi-dry crops 
49 49.40  516  86.50  17 
Pulses 37  37.05  n.a.  86.50  - 
Tobacco 59  61.75  209  86.50  41 
Fodder crops  n.a.  19.76  n.a.  37.05  - 
Others n.a.  -  n.a.  86.50  - 
 
Notes: 
a For 18 months crop.  For 12 month crop, Rs 370 
b For 12￿18 months crop. For less than 12 months crop, Rs 150. 
d  For 1st crop. For subsequent crops, Rs 99.  
d  For 1st crop. For subsequent crops, Rs 40.  
n.a. Not applicable 
 
For levying and collecting water charges, KBJNL has accorded priority to bulk 
water supplies on a volumetric basis to farmers￿ societies and the collection of volumetric 
water rates.
16 This type of wholesaling of water is a departure from the normal approach of 
collecting water fees from individual farmers based on the area and crop irrigated.  
Volumetric wholesaling has the advantage to the agency of reducing its transaction costs in  
                                                           
16 In choosing this approach, the Nigam is bypassing the gram panchayats (village councils), that are 
otherwise empowered under section 203 of the Karnataka Panchayat Act, 1993, to contract to collect taxes 




collecting, by only having to collect from groups rather than many individuals.  It could also 
introduce incentives to save water, because the groups would be billed based on amount of 
water used.  However, this approach requires strong user groups that are able to collect fees 
from their members.  Moreover, the groups have to pass on the incentives to conserve to 
their members, and this is not easy because water is not metered at the individual farm level 
(Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza 1996). The Karnataka state government￿s policy on 
participatory irrigation management is being formulated, and the various acts and rules are 
being amended as needed. KBJNL has to provide water supply to individual users in 
non-society areas.  
To keep administrative costs low, KBJNL has proposed to entrust levy and 
collection of water rates to the O & M field staff, with one additional assistant 
engineer/junior engineer and one additional first division accounts assistant at the 
sub-divisional level, for effectively managing the process of levy and collection.  After 
societies are adjusted to bulk water supplies, the O & M field staff will be re-deployed in 
new non-society areas.   
  KBJNL proposes three modes for collection of water rates, whereby users or 
societies can pay at the agency￿s sub-divisional cash counter, designated banks, or directly 
to the concerned section officer of the irrigation department. Levy and collection tasks will 
be carried out at the sub-divisional level, supervised at the divisional level, and monitored at 
the circle level. Passbooks will be issued to users as prescribed by the government. For 




delayed period. Cases of non-payment of water rates and penalty may be referred to the 
Revenue Department for recovery as arrears of land revenue.   
  For effective levy and collection of water fee in the UKP, as outlined above, KBJNL 
has proposed the following changes in the legal framework suggested to transfer power to 
levy and collect water fees from the general revenue department or irrigation department of 
the state to the Executive Engineer of KBJNL, except in case of recovering the arrears. 
   In practice, KBJNL is assessing water charges of Rs 50 million per year, but the 
collection rate is only 50%. This is at least partly because KBJNL staff lack the enforcement 
powers accorded to the Revenue Department officials who collect water charges in the non-
KBJNL area of the state.  Even this 50% that is collected goes to the state exchequer, rather 
than directly to KBJNL, thereby losing any connection between farmer payments and 
KBJNL revenues, as would be required for a financially autonomous agency. 
  The new fee recovery strategy focuses on volumetric sales, and organizing users 
to become involved in system management and fee collection. But the failure to consult 
with users about basic issues in canal development, fees, or contracts, has created 
resistance. The approach remained typically top down.  When farmers came to know of the 
hefty increases in the proposed water rates, they started agitations, mobilised political 
support, and thwarted any increase in water rates.  As a result, the same old water fees are 
levied and only part of that is collected. This is nowhere near the actual expense on O&M of 
the project, not to talk of any interest or part of the loans raised. Thus, the potential of 






To address the problems of the irrigation sector, financially autonomous, farmer-financed 
irrigation agencies need to create different incentives for the agency and its staff.  However, 
that has not been an objective of the agency as a whole, so it has not been translated into the 
work plans or reward structure of KBJNL.   
A major reason that switching from a government irrigation department to KBJNL 
did not improve incentives for service delivery lies in the fact that more than 95 per cent of 
the staff, including the managing director and director of finance are on deputation from 
various government departments to KBJNL.
17 As a result, the work culture has hardly 
changed in the new set up. Lack of proper recruitment policies and incentive and 
disincentives structures have led to inadequate professionalism. Even the management 
board hardly has any professionals. 
A second reason that service delivery has not increased under KBJNL is that, 
although it was set up to be financially autonomous, in fact the state stands behind the 
organization.  Water charges still go to the state treasury rather than directly to KBJNL, 
This means that, although KBJNL was originally designed to be a financially 
autonomous body, it functions as a conventional government agency.  The staff￿s identity 
and reward structure are not related to the performance of KBJNL.    
                                                           
17 By the end of 1998 there were 1293 technical (up from 487 in March 1996) and 2478 non-technical (up 
from 721) staff on deputation; the majority belong to the irrigation department. To perform the key functions 
(like monitoring finance, handling computers, designing), KBJNL has 41 technical and 87 non-technical staff 






Third, there is no mechanism to generate and sustain farmer participation in this 
new set up. Although the state has a participatory irrigation management policy that 
encourages formation of water users associations in canal commands, the responsibility 
for such tasks rests not within KBJNL but with the Cooperatives Wing of the Command 
Area Development Authority.  KBJNL has not designed any plans to involve water users 
and other stakeholders in the project to participate in resource mobilisation, system 
operation and maintenance, water distribution, and water fee collection and related 
activities.  As a result, organisational structure and decision-making process has remained 
top-down.  
This situation is aggravated by the lack of a regulatory body to examine costs, set 
fee levels, or respond to farmer complaints. The KBJNL by-laws make provision for the 
Nigam to reset water fee levels, levy and collect it. In practice, even after six years, it 
could not increase the water fee levels. Even a regulatory body has not been set up to 
examine costs and monitor the process. On the other hand, anticipating the proposed 
water fee hike, the farmers￿ lobby has organised a series of agitations over the last few 
years. These protests, held both in the project area and in state capital, were fueled by the 
lack of transparency and stakeholder involvement in the system management. Farmer￿s 
opposition to increasing irrigation charges is gaining momentum. The political 
implications of this opposition have made the government even more reluctant to address 
repayment issues. 
  Thus we see that because many of the staff are seconded from government line 
departments,




staff is that they are only there for a fixed period of time.  Further, the main clients are the 
bondholders, who are not the farmers.  The need to assure the bondholders that they will be 
repaid provides some leverage to raise water fees, but because the farmers were not 
consulted about this and see no improvement in system performance, they oppose the 
increase.  Moreover, because the expectation of bond-holders, rating agency, agency staff 
and farmers alike is that the government will pay, their behavior based on these expectations 
is no different from "business as usual."  Functional hierarchy, lack of accountability, and 
inadequate performance measurement practices, lack of consultations with stakeholders, 
file maintenance, and method of management information system indicates it is more of 
an extension of government department.  
Nor did the corporation link incentives with performance to do a better and 
quicker job.  When the National Irrigation Administration of the Philippines became 
financially autonomous, it introduced incentives to increase agency income and reduce its 
costs at the project level, and included these incentives in the performance appraisals of 
the employees. KBJNL has had no plans (as of 2000) to do any of this.  
REPLICABILITY  
 
  To some extent, the motives for and benefits of KBJNL cannot be understood 
without looking at water rights.  Accelerating the process of irrigation development in 
UKP doesn￿t just reduce lags and therefore cut costs, but it also secures water rights 
under the Bhachawat Award. Delays in implementation between 1995 and 2000 not only 




Award is reviewed. If states see demand for water rising in the future, the value (in 
economic and political terms) of UKP in securing water may be greater than the 
estimated returns on the irrigation system alone. 
 One  more  corporation known as Karnataka Neeravari Nigam Limted (KNNL) has 
been formed on the lines of KBJNL, to raise funds and manage eight irrigation projects in 
the Krishna basin of Karnataka. Four more corporations are being planned on similar lines. 
The corporation is authorised to charge suitable water rates for irrigation, municipal, to city 
corporations, and industrial use. KNNL has an authorised capital of Rs 30 billion and it has 
so far raised Rs 2.47 billion from two issues.  
  Other Indian states have similarly adopted the Nigam approach to funding irrigation 
development.  The extent to which other developing countries can rely on their domestic 
bond market is likely to depend on the size and structure of their capital markets and the 
level of investor confidence in  repayment.  Indian government rules governing investment 
of pension funds and other institutional funds has certainly helped KBJNL to raise funds, as 
have income tax exemptions on infrastructure investments.  Confidence that investors will 
be repaid must come from either the organization￿s track record in raising resources or the 
financial stability of the government that backs it, since the systems￿ ￿assets￿ actually have 
little collateral value in the case of failure to repay.  





  The latest trend in financing canal irrigation in India harks back to colonial ventures 
to raise funds for canals and other infrastructure investments in India. Several states have 
now launched irrigation corporations, with the primary objective to raise financial resources 
from the market to build irrigation structures. Their genesis lies in the acute scarcity of 
financial resources faced by the respective state governments, and the compulsions to build 
the irrigation structures rapidly. The financial crunch for canal irrigation has been felt 
because of stoppage/suspension of loans from the World Bank or the Central government, as 
the concerned projects have invited criticism and dispute either from the people at large, due 
to poor implementation of R&R, or from the riparian states. These states, finding it difficult 
to mobilise funds under normal procedures, are raising funds from the market by floating a 
corporation. To get the confidence of lenders, the state governments not only gave a 
guarantee to the bondholders to pay back the interest and the principal amount if the 
corporation failed to do so but also actively persuaded them to buy these bonds.  
Theoretically, these corporations can usher in reforms in the canal irrigation of 
those basins/projects, and put them on a sustainable track, but their activities largely have 
remained concentrated in mobilising large funds, and spending them liberally to complete 
the structures in reasonably short time. Flow of funds is faster: it takes only 1 to 2 weeks 
to get money from KBJNL and pay it to contractors, compared with 2-3 months in a 
system where funds have to come from the government. As a result, the construction 
activity stayed more or less on schedule. Thus, overall, it appears that there is some 




between expenditures incurred and potential created. This, in turn, should  help towards 
containing the escalation in the costs to the extent they were due to delays in 
implementation emanating from lack of resources, or erratic/halting release of funds. But 
it is difficult to measure precisely how much is the gain in cost reduction under the 
current set up vis-a-vis the departmental set of GOK without looking into other aspects 
too.   
Whether it has led to reduction in cost, whether expenditures patterns have been 
transparent and productive, and whether these corporations have infused the spirit of 
efficiency in the functionaries by linking incentives with performance, remains doubtful. 
A detailed analysis of the style of their functioning reveals that although these 
corporations, including KBJNL, appear to be financially autonomous, they are really still 
dependent on the state, and they fail to deliver reforms beyond mobilisation of capital 
funds and construction of physical infrastructure. These corporations basically remain a 
means for raising funds from the market, thus bypassing the limits imposed on state 
borrowing by the Planning Commission and the Reserve Bank of India. Failure to 
consider repayment of the capital remains their greatest weakness.   
  KBJNL has not ushered in major performance improvements, mainly because the 
agency has some in-built lacunae: a) The environs demanded raising money fast, and this 
they did.  What it didn’t do is pay any attention to the long-term sustainability of the system, 
either in terms of financial sustainability or managerial and infrastructure sustainability; b) 
To fulfill the credit rating agency requirements KBJNL had made some promises like 




through WUAs.  Even after six years of KBJNL functioning, these promises were not kept 
nor were there serious attempts to move towards in that direction; and c) Improvement in 
performance of the system was neither part of its objective, nor do its current functions 
stress performance.  This is in spite of most of the irrigation project review studies 
emphasizing the crucial need for performance improvement.  Here, the emphasis is on rapid 
construction.  
Clearly there is a lack of vision among the management staff about what a 
financially autonomous irrigation agency can do. Both agency staff and farmers 
interviewed believe that the state will repay all debts, and they continue to act based on that 
premise of "business as usual."   Furthermore, many of the staff has no long-term 
identification with KBJNL, nor an incentive to see it succeed, because they are only on 
deputation from the government of Karnataka (especially the regular Irrigation Department).
  
KBJNL in its present form is not sufficiently equipped to address the larger issues of 
the reforms in the irrigation sector: increasing efficiency in project performance; increasing 
agricultural productivity; enhancing revenue generation; providing users more productive 
roles to play in the project; reducing operational costs over time; or sustainable management 
of the project.  As a result, they do not inspire the confidence of farmers to overcome images 
of inefficiency and corruption.  The result is that farmers are opposing increases in irrigation 
fees.   
  In the whole process, the KBJNL has achieved its key mandate of mobilising 
adequate funds and completing physical structures on schedule.  But they fail to generate 




state, and like many other corporations, whether they are for state transportation or for 
power generation and supplies, these are also likely to become financially sick.  
Furthermore, unless they address the need to improve service delivery and orientation of the 
staff, farmers will continue to resist any efforts to increase cost recovery and contribute to 
financial viability.  After a decade or so, some expert committee may come and recommend 
their closure. The experiment of ushering reforms to improve the overall functioning of 
canal irrigation through financially autonomous irrigation agencies such as KBJNL may 
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